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Interview
CWBR AUTHOR INTERVIEW: JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CIVIL
WAR ERA
Cooper, William J., Jr.
Fall 2008

Interview with William J. Cooper, Jr.
Interviewed by Christopher Childers
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): You begin your latest book with the
phrase "Jefferson Davis by William Cooper, once again," of course referring to
your 2000 biography "Jefferson Davis, American." But why Jefferson Davis in
the first place, what lead you to study this man?
William J. Cooper, Jr. (WJC): I've been interested in Davis for a long time.
When I was a senior in college, I wrote my senior thesis on the Confederate
strategy at the end of the war in the West from Atlanta to Bentonville, and of
course Davis was a major character, and that and I went to graduate school and I
thought about Jefferson Davis and my advisor told me that Davis was too
complicated for a graduate student to write a biography about, but I could pick a
portion of his life like "Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War." This seemed to me to
be about as dull as you could get. So I went in a totally different direction, and I
ended up writing about antebellum politics. But Davis was interesting to me and
always in my mind. Nobody ever wrote the biography of Davis that everyone
turned to. I became a dean in the 1980s and when I finished that I was looking
around and I said to myself, "This is the time. If you are ever going to give it a
shot, give it a shot." And so I decided to try it. At that time the Jefferson Davis
Papers project at Rice University was made open to me-- earlier in my career
they had a less than open door policy to let people come in. And so I decided to
take a shot at it.
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CWBR: This collection of essays focuses sharply on Davis the politician and
Davis as the commander-in-chief of the Confederate States of America. And you
characterize Davis as the "consummate antebellum politician," a man who
intimately understood politics as "a means to an end," and he worked to achieve
his goals through deliberation and compromise. Was Davis representative of the
ordinary southern politician? How did he differ from his colleagues?
WJC: I don't think he did differ from his successful colleagues. I could rattle
you off a half dozen more names, but Davis has generally been depicted as a
person who was not a politician; a man who was the antithesis of the politician,
and this depiction did not simply deal with the Confederate States of America,
though it centered on his role as president. But before that he was most often
characterized in the historiography as a person who was stiff-necked, who was
unbending, who as his wife said, "didn't know the arts of a politician and
wouldn't practice them if he knew them." And my research indicated to me that
he was a very different kind of person. I don't think he was that kind of
stiff-necked, unbending man; I think he was a professional politician and he was
really good at what he did.
CWBR: Keeping in the vein of politics here, you say in this book, definitely,
Davis played a critical role in the opposition of the Compromise of 1850, yet as
you also note, this didn't mean that Davis opposed compromise, per se. Why did
he oppose the plan from 1850? And what would he have preferred?
WJC: Well he opposed the plan for 1850 chiefly because of California.
Bringing in California as a free state would end the balance in the Senate. There
would be 16 free states rather than 15, and the slave states would remain at 15.
He saw southern power in the Senate as absolutely critical in maintaining
southern power in the nation. And he followed Calhoun. Calhoun believed that
you had to have political power to maintain your position in the United States
even if your position was based on views of the constitution. So Davis believed
that California coming in would disrupt the balance and would weaken southern
power. He also objected because California was being handled a way differently
from any preceding territory becoming a state. It was done so quickly with no
territorial phase, which would eliminate any possibility for Southerners to
participate in its settlement. That's why he opposed the Compromise of 1850 so
desperately.
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What he preferred and what he had supported and voted for in 1848 was to
extend the Missouri Compromise line. He also voted in 1848 for the proposal
that would turn the question of slavery and the territories of to the federal
judiciaryâ€”the so-called Clayton proposal, which like the Missouri Compromise
extension, passed the Senate, but failed in the House. He supported both of
those, because he thought those were dividing the question, giving the South a
fair chance; whereas he thought the Compromise of 1850, with California as the
headlight, didn't give the South a chance and broke equality.
CWBR: Davis urged caution during the secession crisis and he didn't support
immediate secession. Did southerners ever question Davis's suitability for the
Confederate presidency based on his supportâ€”albeit qualifiedâ€”of the Union?
WJC: Well, not really I don't think. There may have been a few radicals who
thought Davis had been too conservative, but not for most Southerners. He was
not like Alexander Stephens, who had actually opposed secession at the Georgia
secession convention. Once it became clear that Mississippi was down the road
to secession, Davis said fine. When he was in Jackson, in November 1860 at the
meeting of the congressional delegation for the governor to make his decision on
how to approach the legislature and the crisis, Davis opposed immediate action
and he told the governor this. But when Davis left that meeting to go to
Washington, he made it very clear that what Mississippi decided was where he
would go. When he first got to Washington in December, he was very dismayed
and very depressed and didn't think there was any chance that any kind of
compromise, and then his spirits lifted a bit at mid-month. As he said, he didn't
really give up on the Union, until the failure of the Committee of Thirteen in the
Senate. But he was not looked upon as somebody who had really opposed
secession, like Alexander Stephens. He was looked upon as a moderate, and that
was terrifically important, especially to people in the Upper South states. People
in states like Virginia had informed some of those who were going out that they
needed to put in a moderate man like Davis.
CWBR: Now you certainly make clear too that Davis has held firm loyalties
to the Union. Yet you also note that early on in the war Davis wanted to make,
"the enemy know firsthand that the sting of war." How would you describe
Davis's feelings toward northerners, and toward bringing the war to them? And
then, how did Davis's outlook harden over the course of the war years?
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WJC: In the beginning, what Davis wanted was for the Confederacy to be
left alone, but he didn't really think that was going to happen. He didn't believe
the North would let the South go without a struggle, and he foresaw a very long
and difficult struggle. At the same time, I don't think Davis had any enmity
toward Northerners, per se. He began to have a real antipathy toward the Lincoln
administration because of what he saw as a harsh war policy. Confederate
territory came into Union hands in 1861 and from then on every month, every
week almost, more and more fell. What he saw was not only Union armies
pushing Confederate armies back or overrunning Confederate forces, but he saw
buildings burned, he saw people put on the road as refugees, he saw a war against
civilians. And then, of course, when the Union army began to employ blacks that,
in the South, that raised a specter that haunted Southerners for generationsâ€”the
idea of race war. He saw the Emancipation Proclamation as an utterly brutal act
that endangered southern civilians, particularly women and children. By 1862,
when the South had been invaded, and he saw what he called this brutality, and
what modern historians call the hard War, he wanted the North defeated. He
wanted northern civilians to know what they were perpetrating on the South, and
the only reason northern civilians didn't feel it was because he didn't have the
wherewithal to make them feel it.
You argue in this book that Davis saw the fight for the Confederacy as a
"holy mission." The Union had failed and so the principles of 1776 had to be
secured through a "revolution against politics" as George Rable has put it. Did
Jefferson Davis foresee an eventual return to a more traditional form of politics
or would fealty to the Confederacy always amount to a "holy mission" even after
independence had been gained?
WJC: I can't answer that. His great goal was to have an independent
Confederacy. If the Confederacy had in fact won its independence, none of us
knows what would have happened. I simply can't answer that question, but he
certainly believed that as long as the Confederacy was in balance that the old
politics had to disappear.
CWBR: You argue that as the conflict progressed, political concerns
dominated Davis's strategic thinking, again linking the idea of politics and war
aims. To what extent did these concerns about politics hamper the Confederate
war effort?
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WJC: I don't think that he got more concerned about the political aspects of
the war as the war progressed. I think that was in the forefront from the very
beginning. I argue that Fort Sumter was his first great political strategic act,
because Fort Sumter was a political act more than a military act in my judgment.
I think if Davis never had to concern himself with politics he might have done
things differently. But in some ways I think that's a false question, because he
himself said there was no way to separate the two. He existed in a world in which
politics had to play a part. Probably if politics wasn't involved at all, you could
say well he may have jettisoned the Trans-Mississippi early on. He did say that it
was a tough job to have politics and war at the same time. Maybe he would have
concentrated more on other issues as some of his critics said he should have
done, but I'm not sure. That's a hard question to answer.
CWBR: You mention in the book, too, though that one of the problems that
Davis faced was that he felt he had to keep troops throughout the Confederacy.
WJC: That's right, he did.
CWBR: And he had to do that, in your opinion, to maintain the political
balance?
WJC: He had to do that to maintain loyalty. Davis knew there was no
Confederate nationalism in 1861. He said on one occasion that Confederate
nationalism was being created in the cauldron of war. He looked to the
Revolution. He saw American nationalism being created in the American
Revolution. So he thought it could be doneâ€”that Confederate nationalism could
be created. But it didn't exist when the war began in his own mind, nor in mine.
He looked at portions of his country and he was told by politicians and by
soldiers that in places like Arkansas, for example, that if he didn't defend
Arkansas that it would probably leave the Confederacy. And if Arkansas left who
might be next? As he explained to one of his generals, he said, "When we give up
on a place we not only lose territory, we tend to lose men as well," because their
loyalty had not yet been secured by the Confederate government in his own eyes.
And I think he was right.
CWBR: You also discuss in here that Davis tended to be a micromanager.
WJC: Only in one sense. He was a micromanager in Richmond in directing
the war. He had several Secretaries of War and all but one was quite able. But in
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dealing with his generals he was not a micromanager. I argue emphatically that
he was not, that in fact, he should have managed them more carefully and more
closely. When he appointed a senior general to a major post he basically left that
general alone. He might make suggestions and he did make suggestions, but he
was not a micromanager of his generals in the fieldâ€”not at all. I would argue
that Lincoln was much more of a micromanager over his generals in the field
than Davis. But in running the general war, letters left the War Department with
the Secretary of War's signature and with the adjutant general's signature, but all
the decisions were Davis's decisions. You can look at the materials he looked at,
and as president the stuff that came across his desk you can see his endorsements.
Does a piece of artillery go here or there? He liked to talk to his Secretaries of
War and would have long conversations with them. He wanted them to talk and
he wanted their opinions, but he made the final decision on almost everything.
But once appointed somebody as a generalâ€”even people he didn't really like
very muchâ€”he left them out there to do what they would do.
CWBR: In Davis's estimation the Confederacy faced "victory and liberty, or
defeat and enslavement." Did he ever talk of defeat and enslavement, in
particular, in the postbellum years?
WJC: No. During the war he did say we that if we lose, we will become
slaves of a horrible North. After the war he kept very quiet about public
questions, particularly because he had been imprisoned and he had never become
reconciled to the new order of things in terms, for example, trying to get his
citizenship back. He refused to do that. He realized that if he made any comments
about public matters, it would only serve to hurt those he cared most about, that
is, the South and the southern states. So he didn't comment publicly on public
matters. In terms in what was happening inside the South, privately he did feel
that during the Reconstruction years that the South was basically in servitude. He
applauded the end of Reconstruction; he applauded the restoration of white
supremacy. And if you look at his public speeches in the 1880s, he is not a fellow
who is standing up bemoaning and lamenting. He is looking at the future; he is
talking about the future. He says he is proud of his country. I think that's because
by 1880, he saw that the South was back in the hands of those people that he
thought should have control of it. But during Reconstruction, he never made a
public comment about Reconstruction that I know of.
CWBR: Now in sort of the same vein, you state that Davis believed that
Northerners, especially the Republicans, challenged the Americanness of the
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South. Did Jefferson Davis see his "holy crusade" as a way to prove that
Southerners were true Americans, and in Davis's mind was the true America lost
with the death of the Confederacy?
WJC: Davis saw the Confederacy as the true America without any question.
He believed that. When the Confederacy failed, as Davis said toward the end of
his life, many of his hopes and aspirations fell with it and his conviction about
the future fell. But then I think, as I try to argue, that by 1880 his view had
changed; that he is much more optimistic, that he applauds his country. He says
that all Southerners should be proud Americans. I think he thought by the end of
Reconstruction that the America he had cherished was in fact gone, but there was
an America there that deserved southern loyalty and southern allegiance. And it
had his loyal allegiance, though he refused to do those things that would have
given him his citizenship back, because in his own mind he said, "those people
didn't have the right to take it, so I don't have the right to hold it; I'm not going to
give them the opportunity to give it back to me or reject me." You can say tha
was pretty stiff-necked, but that was holding to a dogma he had about the
legitimacy of what he had done in 1861, its constitutionality, and the correctness
of it. But if you look at the last public address he gave to a group of young men
near his home on the Mississippi coast in the last years of his life, he tells those
young people that they need to look forward, that they can't be trapped by the
past and they should be proud of being Americans.
CWBR: Now in your last essay you raise a really fascinating point about the
creation of the Lost Cause ideology, and you mention in there that the Lost Cause
ideology was based in some part on omitting slavery from the history of the Civil
War. What role did Davis play in creating that Lost Cause ideology and in trying
to create it in part by omitting the idea of slavery from the causes of the Civil
War?
WJC: In that last essay, I argue that Davis had a very important role to play.
He was not young enough, as some of the men who historians normally point to
as the real founders of the Lost Cause ideology, but was an older man and older
generation. If you look at his memoir, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government, which was published in 1881, he specifically says in it that slavery
was not the cause of war. If you look at the remarks he made in Montgomery in
1886, which was the focus of that essay, again there is nothing said about
slavery. But if you contrast those remarks with the remarks he made in
Montgomery in 1861, when he was the provisional president, in both his actual
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inaugural address and the remarks he made in public before that in Montgomery
he put slavery at the very forefront of what was going on. So I think he was
absolutely in sync, if you will, with the general thrust of southern opinion at that
time that was putting slavery and race out of it. The unity of North and South was
coming, was taking place and nobody wanted to talk about slavery, and
Southerners certainly didn't.
CWBR: Thank you.
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